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Abstract
1
 
The current resurgent interest in Artificial Intelligence 
(AI) has been driven by the availability of data (particularly 
labelled data), the democratisation of computing 
infrastructure and tooling, and the ability to combine these 
elements to create AI algorithms.  Benefit is achieved once 
an algorithm is deployed into an operational system to 
achieve an operational advantage. 
  The ability to exploit the opportunities offered by AI 
within UK Defence calls for an understanding of systemic 
issues required to achieve an effective operational 
capability.  This paper provides the authors’ views of issues 
which currently block UK Defence from fully benefitting 
from AI technology. These are situated within a reference 
model for the AI Value Train, so enabling the community to 
address the exploitation of such data and software intensive 
systems in a systematic, end to end manner.  
The paper sets out the conditions for success including: 
• Researching future solutions to known problems and 
clearly defined use cases; 
• Addressing achievable use cases to show benefit;  
• Enhancing the availability of Defence-relevant data; 
• Enhancing Defence ‘know how’ in AI; 
• Operating Software Intensive supply chain eco-systems 
at required breadth and pace; 
• Governance and, the integration of software and 
platform supply chains and operating models. 
1 Introduction 
The UK Ministry of Defence (MOD), like the US 
Department of Defense (DoD), has an ongoing need to 
adapt and flexibly employ military forces to meet changing 
operational needs [1, 2, 3, 4]. The US pursuit of the ‘third 
offset’ under initiatives such as Project Maven places 
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significant emphasis on the exploitation of relevant data sets 
– a point reinforced by the UK’s Vice Chief of the Defence 
Staff – using modern data analysis techniques including 
Artificial Intelligence (AI). Generating the notion of 
‘algorithmic warfare’, the US intent is to generate and 
maintain an unassailable data exploitation position for its 
competitive operational advantage.  AI becomes a force 
multiplier, with data the de facto ‘Centre of Gravity’. 
1.1 Systems Approach 
Taking a ‘systems approach’ requires looking at an issue 
within the context of the system in its entirety, considering 
the systems behaviour as a whole, as distinct from focusing 
on parts of the system in isolation [5]. In accordance with 
principles of Boundary Critique, a critical first stage is to 
define the problem and the ‘system under study’ [6] – what 
is included and excluded fundamentally shapes the ability of 
the UK Defence enterprise to fully realise the benefits of AI. 
It is not just the system in which AI might be embedded, but 
the wider system (or even system of systems) that is 
required to deploy and exploit the AI technology. 
The recent resurgence in AI has been driven by a near 
exponential growth in the availability of data (particularly 
labelled data), computing power, open/affordable tooling, 
and the ability to put these elements together to create, 
deploy and employ superior algorithms to deliver benefit to 
an enterprise.  Therefore these are all parts of the system 
(see Figure 1), yet in pulling the elements together, there is 
also the realisation that Defence is itself a system of systems 
(which by its nature is complex and adaptive). Therefore 
this process will have inherent frictions which must be 
overcome with the appropriate degree of planning rigour. 
Further there is the fact which we have all become very 
well aware of over the last 30 years and that is the rapid rate 
of technology development within Information Systems.   
Additionally, in the military, as in so many domains, there is 
uncertainty over the future situations within which military 
forces will be required to operate and thus the performance 
required from their socio-technical Information Systems 
(including AI). The complexities of the Contemporary 
Operating Environment, and the potential vagaries of that in 
the future, present planning conundrums – is a capability 
deigned to be versatile for use across much of the Spectrum  
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Figure 1: Strawman AI Value Train 
of Conflict? Or is it narrowly defined for use in a specific 
type of operation and adversary? This uncertainty coupled 
with the ‘democratisation of technology’ means that 
Defence needs to act at sufficient pace to maintain 
Information Advantage as and when it is required along 
temporal, geographic and mission-specific lines. It would be 
unrealistic to expect it to be sustained indefinitely. UK 
Defence must be able to quickly generate it when needed. 
Additionally the system needs to be affordable, a by no 
means insignificant factor in a time of strong fiscal head-
winds for UK Defence.  Therefore, we need the ability to 
evolve our AI system in an effective, timely and cost-
effective manner.  These four elements are illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
Figure 2: Four elements of the broad context of AI 
2 AI immaturity: Defence Challenge to AI 
Technical Capabilities 
One challenge with the adoption of AI within Defence is 
that many Defence tasks require AI capabilities which are 
currently immature.  Examples include [7, 8]: 
 Military decision-making within combat operations can 
be characterised as having a “high regret” if the “wrong” 
decision is made; so requiring a high degree of trust in 
any decision-making conducted by AI and the associated 
need for interpretability. The complexity of this challenge 
is compounded by the need to consider military-decision-
making in different combat scenarios, operating envi-
ronments and levels of command. This is an open re-
search question. 
 Military operations may be undertaken against an ac-
tive opponent, who is deliberately attempting to deceive 
the AI systems; and the adversary may be using their own 
AI systems to control the deception operation. This is an-
other open research question. 
 Military operations will almost certainly be Multi-
Domain in nature, with force elements active across 
Land, Maritime, Air, Space and Cyber domains in paral-
lel, creating the need for AI capable of linking across 
highly-dispersed warfighters and agents (robotic and 
software) operating in complex environments (another 
open research question). 
 Military operations are frequently conducted in new 
settings, so there is a need for AI which can operate ef-
fectively with sparse data sets and very little training data 
(another open research question). 
 Military operations are increasingly Coalition opera-
tions in which many parties come together to achieve 
common aims, but operate under different sets of policies 
and with differing levels of trust.  Thus there is a need for 
AI systems which can learn and reason effectively when 
distributed across a set of partners, whilst also retaining 
the ability for the UK to operate alone for sovereign pur-
poses (another open research question). 
 Tactical military operations are also characterised by 
their operation on edge computing infrastructures with 
limited resources, and an electro-magnetic spectrum that 
is both congested and contested.  This is a very different 
setting for the typical server farm or ‘cloud’ environment 
and again gives rise to open research questions. 
Defence funded AI research is active in these areas, yet if it 
is to avoid the sins of its past, there is the need to manage 
stakeholder expectations very carefully, so that their de-
mand signal for AI is pragmatic and achievable. The MOD 
Chief Scientific Adviser has been particularly direct in his 
description of AI.  His description of it being ‘no more than 
architecture, data and algorithms’ was deliberate, noting that 
there is a danger of AI being ‘over-sold’ and thus uninten-
tionally entering a ‘trough of despondency’ within Defence. 
Finally it is worth touching on the need to match the ca-
pabilities and behaviour of AI ensembles to the type of un-
derstanding and decision-making activity which is being 
undertaken.  Here it is worth reflecting on the very different 
responses needed by systems (including human organisa-
tions) when addressing open versus closed questions [9]; or 
when being data or hypothesis led in their attempt to under-
stand the world [10].  Ongoing Army-sponsored research 
suggests that the Understanding function as doctrinally codi-
fied is itself unachievable – staffs are almost certain to never 
be able to fully appreciate or comprehend a situation (espe-
cially if it is in the chaotic region of the Cynefin Framework 
or is a ‘wicked problem’), but instead must be able to inter-
pret certain events and factors at a given point in time, or 
seek to predict any future change which may occur. The 
research suggests that understanding is more closely linked 
to risk mitigation and tolerance for any decision-making 
which follows. This is where AI could play a particularly 
important role in helping staffs to focus on the response they 
seek or, even if they do not know it initially, they need it. 
Figure 3: Analyst Sense-Making Process [10] 
3 Nearer term exploitation of AI  
There are, however, many ways in which AI can be used 
within the Defence business, as it is being used within many 
other businesses of a similar size and organisational 
complexity (e.g. within logistics and utilities maintenance).  
Therefore, it is worth focusing on the issues associated with 
nearer term exploitation of AI within Defence. This must, 
going forward, be based on clear and unambiguous use 
cases with varying degrees of complexity and ambition. The 
temptation to keep everything simple and in a neatly framed 
problem is always here. At some point, Defence 
stakeholders need to be bold and embrace more complex 
problems to investigate resolving with AI techniques.  
Use of AI relies on availability of relevant data, 
computing infrastructure, tooling and the ‘know how’ to put 
the elements together to develop algorithms and deploy 
them into the hands of users.   We suggest that tooling and 
computing infrastructures are not the elements limiting the 
ability to deploy AI in many areas (though the diversity of 
MOD computing infrastructures is a factor as discussed in 
section 7).  Instead the critical issues are availability of and 
access to data, particularly labelled data (as discussed in 
section 4), ‘know how’ (as discussed in section 5) and 
operating a software intensive supply chain (as discussed in 
section 6).  
Further the successful integration of AI means changing 
what people do and how the business operates; so it is part 
of a larger business change process. The paradox here is that 
UK Defence is a largely conservative organisation with a 
strong ethos of ‘making do’ and succeeding with limited 
resources.  But its professionalism and strong moral 
component means it recognises the need to adapt and is 
fomenting a drive for far-reaching modernisation.  As such 
it requires business use cases where the benefits of applying 
AI can be clearly articulated, and requires the development 
and testing of the changed business processes as well as the 
technology.  Therefore it benefits from a senior champion 
who must not shy away from the difficult decisions [4]. 
4  Data 
“Data is the raw material of the 21st century” [11], and is 
the foundational component which must be available in 
order to enable exploitation of AI (as without data then there 
is no data for an algorithm to process).  Further the recent 
advance in AI has been driven by the availability of human 
labelled data which is used when training the Machine 
Learning component of an AI system.  Therefore, it is vital 
that early exploitation of AI is driven by the availability of 
sufficient relevant data of sufficient quality, and supported 
by an suitable approach to creating labelled data where that 
is needed.  Note here the point on Data and the centre of 
gravity – UK Defence will not fully embrace the benefits 
unless its data access is addressed, allowing the data to be 
appropriately accessed for exploitation by AI technologies. 
The scale of that challenge must not be underestimated. 
4.1 Defence Data about Defence Systems 
Many Defence Systems are legacy systems or are operated 
in a manner which means their support and maintenance is 
contracted out.  Hence it is by no means always the case that 
the commercial agreement under which they were procured 
makes provision for their instrumentation and for the data, 
from any instrumentation, to be available to the wider 
Defence enterprise. In essence, legacy contractual decisions 
place what is effectively a commercial blocker to AI 
integration and exploitation in the Defence Equipment 
Program’s near-term activity. Moves towards more open 
standards downstream provide greater opportunity and flex, 
yet how are operational demand signals for AI able to be 
met in the interim? 
Further instrumenting Defence assets, so creating an 
effective Internet of Military Things, has implications where 
(i) emission control is needed in order to deny an opponent 
information and (ii) an opponent is actively engaging in 
cyber operations. This is itself acting as a key driver for AI 
– the Future Force hypothesis suggests much smaller 
physical and electronic footprints in the battlespace, which 
is where AI technology which may facilitate this has been 
identified as having particular utility in Land Command and 
Control (C2) studies. In addition there are other implications 
associated with legality, privacy and ethics.  
However, adopting a Defence equivalent of the UK 
Government Open Data Rating scale and applying it across 
Defence projects would help create the conditions for 
success by providing Defence with access to data from its 
own systems. At the same time it must be asked, does 
Defence know where all its data is and can it be made 
readily available for AI testing and experimentation? 
4.2 Data about wider world 
As noted earlier, many Defence operations require data 
about the exterior world.  Thus many Defence systems 
include sensors which collect data about the world.  This is 
not simply data on the physical domain, but also includes 
information about the cognitive and information domains.   
As such data collection and analysis (inc. AI) needs to be 
conducted in a manner which confirms to local and UK 
ethical and legal constraints – including preservation of 
privacy and proportionality. Yet consider the potential 
benefit – could AI be used, for example, to unpick the 
digital ‘fog of war’ and unambiguously identify Indicators 
and Warnings from across data about the wider world which 
could, if appropriately exploited, generate Courses or Action 
which themselves could be accelerated and risks reduced by 
using other AI technologies which feed off the conditions 
and actions or other elements in the system (or even system 
of systems?). 
5  “Know How” within Defence 
There is a recognised shortage of Suitably Qualified and 
Experienced Personnel (SQEP) within the UK to maximise 
the exploitation of AI.  This shortage is naturally reflected 
within Defence across civilian and military staff.  The career 
management of the small pool of Defence SQEP aside, the 
MOD is constrained in its ability to pay more for scarce 
skills.  However, Defence is able to compete for SQEP on 
other grounds.  
In response to the opportunity offered by AI and need to 
manage ‘know how’, the Defence Science and Technology 
Laboratory (Dstl) has created an ‘AI lab’ which aims to be 
“A single pan-Dstl flagship for AI, Machine Learning and 
Data Science that works with suppliers and partners to 
establish a world-class capability in the application of AI 
related technologies to Defence and Security challenges” 
[12].  ‘AI Lab’ will work with similar centres of excellence, 
such as Project Nelson [13], being set up within the Defence 
Commands. 
6  Software Intensive Supply Chain Eco-
System 
Experience dealing with successful Open Systems shows 
that it is equally important to focus on the commercial, 
supply chain and operating model, as it is the technical 
architecture [14, 15].  Additionally, any ‘AI system’ is 
clearly a software intensive system and experience teaches 
that the production of software is best considered a design 
activity rather than a production activity.  Thus there is a 
need to adopt an operating model which employs Lean, 
Agile and DevOps principles and practices, noting that some 
capabilities will be Joint Forces Command-sponsored, 
whilst others will be championed and funded by the Single 
Services.   This naturally has implications for the supply 
chain and commercial strategy adopted to enable the 
acquisition of AI within government systems.  Critically it 
does not lend itself to the standard CADMID model of 
Defence acquisition. 
If one accepts that a significant portion of AI software 
innovation occurs within Small & Medium Enterprises 
(SMEs) then it is necessary to design a supply chain and 
commercial construct that works for such SMEs.  
Traditionally, the large number and size of Defence standard 
terms and conditions which apply to procurement make it 
hard for an SME to engage, as understanding and complying 
with such a large set of terms and conditions is costly.  
Finding an approach which enables the effective integration 
of a wide and rapidly fluctuating pool of SMEs into the 
supply chain of such software intensive systems is a key 
issue which needs further investigation.  It is a long-
standing question in UK Defence which must be tackled 
head on. As a case in point, the Defence and Security 
Accelerator initiative has led to the emergence of some 
startling and potentially ground-breaking proposals and 
proof of concept demonstrations. Yet the pull-through to the 
Equipment Program is so convoluted thereafter, both from a 
Defence stakeholder and SME perspective, that some ideas 
can ‘waste away.’ 
Furthermore, it must address how to deal with the sudden 
unavailability of an SME which has delivered an important 
micro-service.  There are both technical and Intellectual 
Property Right (IPR) challenges.  Firstly, there is the 
technical challenge of maintaining and, when necessary, 
adapting or replacing code which has been generated by an 
SME.  Secondly, the IPR associated with both algorithms 
and data can, at such times, be hugely contentious. Should 
algorithms trained on MOD data be intellectually owned by 
MOD?  There is the need, therefore, to differentiate between 
COTS algorithms used in AI tooling (by MOD and its 
suppliers) and those AI algorithms, and their data 
architectures, generated by the MOD and its suppliers.    
The move to an open system, services, agile, incremental 
and DevOps model would mean that the average size and 
complexity of individual projects will fall.  This will impact 
both major companies and SMEs, as the cost of the 
overheads associated with engaging with Defence will 
become a more significant element of each project – unless 
we can develop new models of engagement which are (in 
the jargon) ‘frictionless’.  Otherwise the attempt to broaden 
the supply pool may have entirely unintended consequences.  
There also exists the need to understand the regulatory 
framework around development and testing of such services 
– particularly given the need to “harness AI for defence & 
security in a manner that is moral & ethical, reinforces 
international norms and counters irresponsible use of AI.” 
This should not stymie AI exploration and the 
understanding of AI threats and opportunities – after all, 
potential UK adversaries may have a radically different 
moral compass – but the strictures it will force have to be 
sensibly acknowledged upfront. 
7  A Fragmented Defence Information 
Infrastructure 
Most organisations contemplating the exploitation of AI 
have a relatively simple information infrastructure.  
Unfortunately this is not the case within Defence.  Defence 
has traditionally been in the business of either ‘equipping 
the man’ or ‘manning equipment’, which leads to a situation 
in which multiple platforms (e.g. ships, boats, planes, 
helicopters & vehicles) are purchased from a wide range of 
suppliers as complete systems.  From a capability 
perspective, the Information Defence Lines of Development 
(DLOD) and essential data can exist in silos of ‘splendid 
isolation.’ Further, over time the information systems 
component of each such platform has become a larger and 
more significant part of it.  Thus we have a multitude of 
information infrastructures provided by any number of 
suppliers; each of which tends to have its own supply chain, 
commercial model, operating model and technical 
architecture – this makes re-use of (micro-)services and data 
across these multiple platforms a challenge. The UK-based 
supply chain is bad enough; reconciling this for deployed 
forces in a theatre of operations unnecessarily adds to the 
Logistics and support burden. 
Figure 4: Tactical Networks 
This is also why Defence has been strongly engaged 
within the development and testing of Open Systems 
approaches.  However, in simple terms it means we are 
operating across the full set of computing paradigms (see 
figure 5).  Importantly, as noted above, the contested nature 
of many Defence operations means that the communications 
infrastructures, and communication qualities of service, 
assumed by COTS solutions are not appropriate. 
Worse still once we deploy forces on operations we are 
aiming to work with a very wide range of partners (see 
figure 6) – thus interoperability is now a non-discretionary 
requirement in UK Defence planning. 
 
Figure 5: Computing Paradigms (image courtesy of IBM) 
Figure 6: Operating in the Urban Environment 
8  Conclusions and Recommendations 
The ability to exploit the opportunities offered by AI within 
UK Defence requires an understanding of systemic issues 
required to achieve an effective operational capability.     
We have set out a strawman reference model for the AI 
Value Train which can potentially provide a common 
system reference model, so enabling the community (though 
provision of a common lens) to address the exploitation of 
such data and software intensive systems in a systematic, 
end to end manner.  
We have discussed the conditions for success including: 
• Researching future solutions to known problems and 
clearly defined use cases; 
• Addressing achievable use cases to show benefit (ones 
where the algorithms and computing infrastructure are 
mature, and data is available); 
• Enhancing the availability of Defence-relevant data 
(outside project boundaries); 
• Enhancing Defence ‘know how’ in AI through centres 
of excellence/competence and growth of expert 
personnel; 
• Operating Software Intensive supply chain eco-systems 
(to access exterior ‘know how’ and operate at required 
pace)); 
• Governance and, the integration of software and 
platform supply chains and operating models. 
In conclusion, we recommend a strategic approach with 
three main lines of action: 
a) Exploit near term opportunities with an eye on the future 
breadth and pace required (see section 3); 
b) Focus on fundamental enablers of Data, Defence ‘know 
how’ and supply chain relationships (see sections 4, 5 & 6): 
i. Develop the supply chain relationship between 
emerging Defence Centres of AI Excellence and wider 
supply chain (see section 5 & 6); 
ii. Develop a strategy to break data out from its current 
silos, addressing both the near-term need and longer-term 
opportunity (c.f. government open data rating scale) (see 
section 4). 
c) Plan for action at required breadth, depth and pace; 
i. Maintain research on maturing AI to cope with future 
defence challenges and clearly defined future use cases 
(see section 1); 
ii. Develop and test the approach to such software 
intensive supply chains (see section 6); 
iii. Develop and test an approach to software intensive 
supply chains and their intersection with the fragmented 
Defence Information Infrastructure (see section 7). 
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